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Recognizing the Danger Posed by Hemp

A powerful high-altitude electromagnetic burst poses a significant danger to military operations.

Recognizing the Problem Posed by Hemp
Recognizing the Problem Posed by Hemp

Recognizing the Danger Posed by Hemp

Headline: Comprehensive Strategies for Coping with High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Threats

The United States military is taking significant steps to protect critical infrastructure and systems from the devastating effects of high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) events. These comprehensive strategies focus on creating integrated, layered missile defense systems with hardened radar and communication components, rapid deployment capabilities, and rigorous system testing to sustain operations despite electromagnetic disruptions.

The immediate goals of these efforts include establishing a clear understanding of current standards for system acquisition as related to EMP survivability. This knowledge is crucial in ensuring the functionality of critical defense systems, such as missile defense radars, under HEMP and related electronic warfare threats.

One such example is the U.S. Missile Defense Agency's requirement for new radar systems supporting the Golden Dome missile-defense network to be HEMP-hardened. This means they can withstand electromagnetic interference and continue operating effectively while discriminating incoming warheads from decoys.

Another key approach is the design of mobile and rapidly deployable hardened systems. This allows defense capabilities to be moved or reconfigured quickly, minimizing vulnerability and maintaining operational resilience. Proposed mobile theater-based radar systems that integrate HEMP hardening are a testament to this strategy.

The importance of testing and validation of hardened systems cannot be overstated. Simulations and static fire trials, including booster modifications for extended-range interceptors like those in the THAAD system, ensure that hardened missile defense components remain effective despite electromagnetic disturbances.

Layered defense integration is another crucial component of these strategies. This includes combining hardened ground-based radars, space-based sensors, AI-driven processing, interceptors, and directed-energy weapons to provide robust protection against various missile threats and associated electronic attacks, including HEMP.

Mitigations against electronic warfare jamming and cyberattacks, which often accompany HEMP events, are also essential. These efforts aim to preserve communication and command integrity through resilient system architectures and encryption.

Additional strategic efforts are being made to harden civilian critical infrastructure such as power grids, cellular towers, and communication networks. However, specific details on governmental or military programs in this area were not detailed in the latest sources reviewed.

The development of these strategies is not without controversy. Some view the EMP Commission, which was active from 2001 through 2009 and reported on the country's vulnerabilities in both 2004 and 2008, as having a political agenda.

Cold War experiments, such as the 1962 Starfish Prime explosion, were conducted to understand the effects of HEMP. The Navy's Electromagnetic Pulse Program was revived in the late 1990s by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

An E1 pulse can induce huge currents in very long conductors such as power and communications lines. The pulse intensity is not necessarily a function of weapon size but rather the amount of gamma radiation generated. E1 pulses peak at tens of kilovolts per meter in a few nanoseconds and last for a few hundred nanoseconds.

It's important to note that the consequences of not protecting against E1 EMP are significant, even though the probability of an E1 pulse occurring is less-known but less than a massive GMD event. E1 EMP can cover hundreds or thousands of square miles.

Dr. Carl E. Baum, one of the leading simulator designers in the US, built the ATLAS-I simulator during the 1970s. The ATLAS-I simulator was used until 1990 and was primarily constructed of wood to be electrically invisible to simulated E1 pulses.

Only three electric utilities in the United States have taken steps in hardening their operational control centers and substation control buildings against EMP, according to Michael Caruso, director of government and specialty business development at ETS-Lindgren.

In summary, the United States military is implementing comprehensive strategies to cope with HEMP threats. These strategies emphasize integrated, layered missile defense systems with hardened radar and communication components, rapid deployment capabilities, and rigorous system testing to sustain operations despite electromagnetic disruptions. This approach preserves functionality across critical military infrastructure against high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse threats.

[1] "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Threats to Critical Infrastructure" - Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2019. [3] "EMP Threats to Critical Infrastructure" - National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017. [4] "Cybersecurity for the Energy Sector" - National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018. [5] "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission" - Federation of American Scientists.

Science and technology play crucial roles in the United States military's strategies to cope with High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) threats. For instance, the development of hardened radar systems like the new radar systems supporting the Golden Dome missile-defense network are enabled by advancements in technology (science and engineering). On another note, testing and validation techniques, such as simulations and static fire trials, are scientific approaches used to ensure the effectiveness of hardened systems during electromagnetic disturbances.

Politics and general news are associated with the controversies surrounding the EMP Commission, which was active from 2001 through 2009. Some view the EMP Commission as having a political agenda, hinting at the potential influence of political dynamics on the development and implementation of these strategies.

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